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Abstract 
Stock market liberalizations lead private investment booms.  In a sample of 11 
developing countries that liberalized their stock markets, 9 experience growth rates of 
private investment above their non-liberalization median in the first year after 
liberalizing.  In the second and third years after liberalization, this number is 10 of 11 and 
8 of 11, respectively.  The mean growth rate of private investment in the three years 
immediately following stock market liberalization exceeds the sample mean by 22 
percentage points.  The evidence stands in sharp contrast to recent work that suggests 
capital account liberalization has no effect on investment. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
A stock market liberalization is a decision by a country’s government to allow 
foreigners to purchase shares in that country’s stock market.  Standard models of 
international asset pricing predict that stock market liberalization may reduce the 
liberalizing country’s cost of equity capital.1  This prediction has two important empirical 
implications for those emerging markets that liberalized their stock markets in the late 
1980s and early 1990s.  First, if stock market liberalization reduces the aggregate cost of 
equity capital, then holding expected future cash flows constant, we should observe an 
increase in a country’s equity price index when the market learns that a stock market 
liberalization is going to occur.  The second implication is that we should observe an 
increase in physical investment following a stock market liberalization, because a fall in a 
country’s cost of equity capital will transform some investment projects that had a 
negative net present value (NPV) before liberalization into positive NPV endeavors after 
liberalization.  Henry (2000) shows that the data confirm the first implication.  This paper 
examines whether the data are consistent with the second implication.  Specifically, in 
order to determine whether stock market liberalizations are associated with increased 
investment, this paper analyzes the behavior of real private investment following stock 
market liberalization in eleven emerging markets. 
Figure 1, which plots the average growth rate of real private investment around 
the time of stock market liberalization in these eleven countries, conveys the central 
message of the story that I will develop in detail.  On average, countries experience large, 
temporary increases in the growth rate of real private investment on the heels of stock 
                                                           
1 See Stulz (1995, 1999a, 1999b) for an extensive survey of this literature. 
 3 
 
 
market liberalization.  More precisely, in the sample of eleven emerging markets 
examined in this paper, the mean growth rate of real private investment in the three years 
immediately following stock market liberalization exceeds the sample mean by 22 
percentage points.  Sign tests on medians confirm the robustness of the increase.  In the 
first year after liberalization, 9 of 11 countries experience growth rates of private 
investment above their non-liberalization median.  In the second and third years after 
liberalization, this fraction is 10 of 11 and 8 of 11, respectively.  The relationship between 
private investment growth and stock market liberalization persists after controlling for 
world business cycle effects, contemporaneous economic reforms, and domestic 
fundamentals.  However, we cannot conclude that stock market liberalizations cause 
investment booms, because the possibility of reverse causality cannot be ruled out.  
A country’s cost of equity capital has two components: the equity premium and 
the risk-free rate.  Thus, there are three reasons why stock market liberalization might 
cause a fall in the liberalizing country’s cost of equity capital.2  First, stock market 
liberalization might increase net capital inflows, and an increase in net capital inflows 
could reduce the risk-free rate.  Second, allowing foreigners to purchase domestic shares 
facilitates risk sharing between domestic and foreign residents.  Increased risk sharing 
should reduce the equity premium.  Finally, Levine and Zervos (1998b) demonstrate that 
increased capital inflows may also increase stock market liquidity.  Increased liquidity 
will also reduce the equity premium (Ahimud and Mendelson, 1986; Ahimud et al., 
1997).  
___________ 
 
2From now on, I will refer use the phrase, ‘cost of capital’ interchangeably with ‘cost of equity capital’. 
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However, it is important to realize that liberalizing the stock market need not 
always cause a fall in the cost of equity capital.  While stock market liberalization 
unambiguously reduces the equity premium, it could, in principle, lead to an increase in 
the risk-free rate.  If the liberalizing country’s risk-free rate rises following stock market 
liberalization, then its cost of capital could increase.  Whether a country’s risk-free rate 
rises or falls following stock market liberalization depends crucially on whether: 1) the 
liberalization of restrictions on capital inflows through the stock market is accompanied 
by a liberalization of restrictions on capital outflows by domestic residents; 2) the autarky 
risk-free rate, which is an equilibrium outcome of aggregate savings and investment, is 
above or below the world rate at the time the liberalization occurs.  Section 3 presents a 
detailed discussion of these issues. 
Stock market liberalization is a specific type of a more general policy reform 
called capital account liberalization, which is a decision by a country’s government to 
remove restrictions on capital inflows and outflows more generally.  The empirical 
literature on capital account liberalization can be separated usefully into two strands: 
finance and macroeconomics.  Tesar (1995), Tesar and Werner (1998), and Stulz (1995, 
1999a, 1999b) provide comprehensive surveys of the finance literature on capital account 
liberalization and international risk sharing.  The central message is that the portfolios of 
developed-country investors are still biased toward domestic securities, but capital 
account liberalization has led to greater diversification.  The effects of increased financial 
integration are most readily seen in emerging market stock prices.  Kim and Singal 
(2000), Henry (2000), and Bekaert and Harvey (2000) find evidence consistent with the 
hypothesis that stock market liberalization causes a one-time revaluation of emerging 
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market stock prices and a fall in the cost of capital.  Levine and Zervos (1998b) provide 
evidence that suggests that stock market liberalization also increases liquidity.  These 
papers confirm that stock market liberalization has financial effects, but they do not 
address the investment question. 
On the other hand, the empirical macroeconomics literature looks at the impact of 
capital account liberalization on investment.  Levine and Zervos (1998a) examine 
whether countries experience a permanent increase in the growth rate of their capital 
stocks when their stock markets become more integrated with the rest of the world.  They 
find no evidence that increased stock market integration leads to permanently higher 
capital stock growth rates.  This result is somewhat surprising given the evidence 
regarding the impact of stock market liberalization on the cost of equity capital.  One 
possible explanation is that stock market liberalization leads to a temporary increase in 
the growth rate of the capital stock, not a permanent increase.   
To examine this possibility, consider a closed economy Solow (1956) model in 
steady state, so that the capital stock and the labor force are growing at the same rate.  
Now suppose that the stock market is liberalized to foreign capital inflows.  If stock 
market liberalization reduces the cost of capital, agents will respond by driving down the 
marginal product of capital to the new cost of capital.  This result can only occur if the 
capital stock temporarily grows faster than the labor force.  Once the marginal product of 
capital equals the post-liberalization cost of capital, the growth rate of the capital stock 
will return to its pre-liberalization rate (i.e., the same rate as the labor force).  In other 
words, theory suggests that stock market liberalization will induce a temporary increase 
in the growth rate of a country’s capital stock.  This paper provides a sharp test of the 
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theory by employing an event study approach that compares the growth rate of private 
investment during stock market liberalization episodes with the growth rate of private 
investment during non-liberalization periods.3 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 briefly reviews previous work and 
explains the contribution of this paper relative to the existing literature.  Section 3 
presents a theoretical discussion of the channels through which stock market 
liberalization may affect aggregate valuation, the cost of capital, and investment.  The 
central message here is not that stock market liberalization will automatically reduce the 
liberalizing country’s cost of equity capital, but that it will probably change that country’s 
cost of capital.  Under reasonable assumptions, the theory predicts that stock market 
liberalization will cause a fall in the liberalizing country’s cost of equity capital.  If stock 
market liberalization reduces a country’s aggregate cost of equity capital, it will also 
cause a temporary increase in the growth rate of investment, via the following 
mechanism:  
Stock Market  Liberalization Stock↑  Prices ↑  Investment         (1) 
Thus, there are two tasks involved in determining whether the data support the theory.  
The first step involves examining the correlation of investment with both liberalization 
and stock prices.  The second step involves determining whether the correlations, if they 
exist, can be given a causal interpretation.   
Section 4 analyzes the correlation of private investment growth and stock market 
liberalization.  First, the existing evidence on the impact of liberalization on risk sharing, 
                                                           
3 A temporary increase in the growth rate of the capital stock implies a temporary increase in the growth 
rate of investment.  The growth rate of investment is analyzed because capital stock data were not available. 
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valuation, and liquidity is summarized.  Next, the analysis turns to the growth rate of 
private investment during liberalization episodes in order to determine whether 
investment is unusually high following stock market liberalizations.  Examination of 
graphs, means, and medians all convey the same message: Investment booms consistently 
follow stock market liberalizations. 
Section 5 analyzes the correlation between the growth rate of private investment 
and changes in stock market valuation.  Although Fischer and Merton (1984), Barro 
(1990), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) and others have demonstrated that higher 
stock returns forecast increased future investment in the U.S., Rama’s (1993) survey 
shows that there is a paucity of evidence on this subject in less-developed countries 
(LDCs).  Moreover, financial markets in LDCs can be characterized as displaying 
financial repression, government directed credit, and the prevalence of informal financial 
markets.  Therefore, it is not obvious that the standard investment stock return 
correlations will hold for this group of countries (see Agénor and Montiel, 1996, on this 
point).  Regressions of private investment growth on stock returns demonstrate a positive 
and significant correlation. 
Section 6 explores alternative explanations for the investment boom.  Having 
demonstrated the plausibility of a causal link from liberalization to investment in Sections 
4 and 5, the question in Section 6 is whether omitted variables or reverse causality can 
explain the investment liberalization correlations.  The analysis here is motivated by the 
fact that the political decision to liberalize a country’s stock market may be endogenous.  
Governments, in general, have an incentive to liberalize the stock market when there is 
good news about the future.  Specifically, liberalizations may be timed to coincide with 
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(1) high points in the world business cycle, (2) the implementation of other economic 
reforms, and (3) positive shocks to aggregate demand and the terms of trade.  Including 
regressors that try to capture these effects explains part of the boom, but stock market 
liberalization retains a statistically significant and an economically meaningful effect on 
the growth rate of private investment. 
The issue of reverse causality is more problematic.  Evidence on the timing of 
stock market liberalizations is presented which suggests that stock markets are not 
liberalized in response to investment booms.  However, the evidence cannot rule out the 
possibility that policymakers liberalize in anticipation of future shocks to the marginal 
product of capital.  Therefore, we cannot conclude that stock market liberalizations cause 
investment booms.  Section 7 presents some conclusions. 
 
2. Previous work 
For clarity, it is worth describing the contributions of this paper relative to Levine 
and Zervos (1998a), and explaining why the results here may differ from those generated 
by Levine and Zervos.  The first contribution is that this paper asks whether stock market 
liberalization causes a temporary increase in the growth rate of the capital stock, whereas 
Levine and Zervos (1998a) ask if increased stock market integration causes a permanent 
increase in the growth rate of the capital stock.  This difference in questions leads to 
methodological differences.  Specifically, the estimation procedure used in this paper 
allows for different stock market liberalization dates across countries.  Levine and Zervos 
use the same break point, 1985, for all of the countries in their sample.  Choosing a 
homogenous break point does not induce important biases into Levine and Zervos’ 
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empirical procedure, since they are testing for a permanent effect.  However, since this 
paper tests for temporary effects, it is important to capture country-specific stock market 
liberalization dates as accurately as possible.  This paper identifies discrete, country-
specific stock market liberalizations using a systematic dating procedure, which is 
described in Section 4.  This dating procedure facilitates an event study approach that 
provides a transparent test of whether stock market liberalization leads to a temporary 
increase in the growth rate of investment.  
This paper makes a second contribution by only including developing countries in 
the sample.  Levine and Zervos’ study contains both developed and developing countries.  
If the general consensus is correct in suggesting that developing countries have a higher 
autarky cost of capital than developed countries, then increased stock market integration 
will lead to faster rates of capital accumulation in developing countries, but slower rates 
in developed countries.  With both developing and developed countries included in their 
sample, Levine and Zervos’ results may suggest that capital account liberalization has no 
effect on investment, but the results may also reflect the differing effects of liberalization 
in each of their subsamples. 
A third contribution of this paper is that it presents a time series of country-
specific policy changes that serves to set the impact of stock market liberalization apart 
from the potentially confounding effects of contemporaneous economic reforms.  The 
paper also controls for time-specific shocks, such as fluctuations in the world business 
cycle. 
The final contribution of this paper is that it focuses on private investment instead 
of using total investment.  Total investment is the sum of government, private, and 
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foreign direct investment (FDI).  The empirical analysis in this paper is based on the 
theoretical relationship between private investment and the shadow value of capital in the 
stock market.  This theory makes no predictions about the behavior of government 
investment.  Therefore, data on private investment may be more appropriate.  The 
behavior of FDI around liberalizations may be of independent interest and is analyzed 
separately in Section 4.  
While it is desirable to understand the implications of stock market liberalization 
for general economic performance, this paper focuses on investment, because there is an 
unresolved debate as to whether capital account liberalization has any effect on real 
investment (Kraay, 1998; Obstfeld 1998; Rodrik, 1998; Rogoff, 1999; Stiglitz, 1999).  
Levine and Zervos (1998a) provide an important first step in documenting the fact that 
capital account liberalization does not lead to a permanent increase in the growth rate of 
the capital stock.  This observation does not necessarily mean, however, that capital 
account liberalization has no effect on investment.  Liberalization might lead to a 
temporary increase in the growth rate of the capital stock.  Given the empirical 
complications inherent in trying to isolate the impact of capital account liberalization, and 
the fact that there has been no formal analysis of the temporary hypothesis, it seems 
reasonable to focus on establishing a reliable set of facts about investment and 
liberalization before tackling broader issues.  
 
3. Stock market liberalization, stock prices, and investment: theory 
As motivation for the empirical analysis to follow, this section presents a 
theoretical discussion of the channels through which stock market liberalization may 
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influence aggregate valuation and physical investment.  An open economy extension of 
the analysis in Section 1.6 of Tobin and Brainard (1977) frames the key issues. 
 
3.1.  Autarky Stock Market Valuation 
Assume that both the domestic stock market and money market are closed to 
foreign investors.  Let tΠ  denote expected aggregate profit per unit of capital, assume all 
profits are paid out as dividends, and let tV  denote the expected present value of 
aggregate profit per unit of capital.  Since it is not central to the argument, ignore 
depreciation of the capital stock.  Further, let tr  be the autarky domestic real interest rate, 
tθ  the autarky equity premium, and assume that the world risk-free interest rate, 
*
tr , is 
less than the domestic risk-free rate tr .  For simplicity of exposition, assume that firms 
expect future interest rates, the equity premium, and profit per unit of capital to remain 
constant.  Since increased risk sharing has theoretically and empirically ambiguous 
implications for the domestic savings rate, assume that stock market liberalization has no 
effect on the domestic savings rate.4  Finally, assume that stock market liberalization has 
no effect on Π . 
Given these assumptions, in the absence of bubbles, the autarky value of the stock 
market is given by 
 
tV r θ
Π
=
+
.                                                                                                                       (2) 
                                                           
4 Levine and Zervos (1998a) find no impact of that increased capital market integration on savings rates.  
See Agénor and Montiel (1996) for an extensive review of the empirical literature on financial liberalization 
and savings. 
 
 12 
 
 
 
Let KP  be the price of a unit of physical capital, and assume that 
 
t KV Pr θ
Π
= =
+
,                                                                                                              (3) 
 
so that the market for capital is in equilibrium and firms are indifferent to investing.  Eq. 
(3), highlights the fact that the discount rate used in evaluating existing projects within a 
country consists of two components: the real risk-free rate of return and the equity 
premium.  Starting from this equilibrium, suppose that the stock market is liberalized to 
foreign investors, but the domestic money market remains closed. 
 
3.2 Stock market valuation after liberalization 
Consider first the impact of stock market liberalization on the equity premium.  In 
autarky, the equity premium, θ , will be proportional to the variance of the country’s 
aggregate cash flows.  Once liberalization takes place and the country’s stock market 
becomes fully integrated, its equity premium will be proportional to the covariance of the 
country’s aggregate cash flows with those of a world portfolio.  Therefore, the necessary 
condition for the equity premium to fall following liberalization is that the variance, 
which can be interpreted as the local price of risk, exceeds the covariance, the global 
price of risk.  Stulz (1999b) demonstrates empirically that every emerging market 
satisfies this necessary condition.  Tesar and Werner (1998), Errunza and Miller (1998), 
and Bekaert and Harvey (2000) also argue that this condition holds in practice.  In 
keeping with the general consensus that the equity premium will fall when a completely 
segmented emerging country liberalizes its stock market, let *θ θ<  be the equity 
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premium which prevails following stock market liberalization. 
 In addition to allowing for increased risk sharing, stock market liberalization may 
also lead to more liquid markets, in which trading equities becomes less costly (Levine 
and Zervos 1998a, 1998b).  Ahimud and Mendelson (1986) and Ahimud et al. (1997) find 
that increased liquidity reduces the equity premium, which decreases the cost of capital 
and raises firm value.  The fact that shareholders demand a liquidity premium means that, 
in addition to the premium they require for bearing systematic risk, they also require 
compensation for the frictional costs of trading equity.  This statement is equivalent to 
saying that the equity premium, θ , consists of two components: (1) the premium required 
for bearing systematic risk, and (2) a liquidity premium.  Therefore, increased liquidity 
also reduces the equity premium. 
From a valuation standpoint, then, the empirical implications of increased 
liquidity are observationally equivalent to the implications of increased risk sharing.  An 
increase in either, or both, reduces the equity premium.  It is therefore important to bear 
in mind that, in addition to increased risk sharing, increased liquidity may play a central 
role in any liberalization-induced valuation and investment boom.  The relative roles of 
risk sharing and liquidity are discussed further in Section 5.2. 
Now consider the impact of stock market liberalization on the risk-free rate.  
Although the assumption is that the domestic money market remains closed following the 
stock market liberalization, the stock market liberalization may have an indirect effect on 
the domestic risk-free rate.  As we have assumed that the domestic savings rate is 
constant, the capital inflow generated by stock market liberalization increases the total 
stock of loanable funds.  This increase could cause the domestic risk-free rate to fall.  Let  
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r r<  be the post-liberalization risk-free rate.  Finally, by assumption, liberalization has 
no impact on the numerator, Π .  Therefore, after the stock market is liberalized, 
aggregate valuation is given by: 
 
*
*t KV Pr θ
Π
= >
+
                                                                                                            (4) 
 
Stock liberalization drives a wedge between market valuation and the price of a new 
machine, thereby generating an incentive for firms to invest in physical capital. 
 
3.3. Objections to the theoretical framework 
There are two key objections to this description of the impact of a stock market 
liberalization on a country’s aggregate valuation and investment.  First, it is possible that 
the autarky risk-free rate might be lower than the world risk-free rate.  Second, it may not 
be reasonable to assume that expected future profits and stock market liberalization are 
uncorrelated.  Each of these objections is now considered in turn.   
Suppose that *r r<  and we allow for the more realistic assumption that the 
domestic money market is also liberalized when the stock market is opened.  In this case, 
in addition to the foreign capital inflow into the stock market, capital will flow out of the 
domestic money market until the domestic risk-free rate rises to the world risk-free rate.  
Although the equity premium still falls due to increased risk sharing, under this scenario 
the countervailing effect of an increase in r  might lead to a net increase in the discount 
rate.  Therefore, if *r r<  in autarky, the post-liberalization cost of capital might actually 
rise following stock market liberalization.  If we observed internal, market-determined 
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interest rates in these countries, it would be instructive to compare pre-liberalization and 
post-liberalization interest rates.  Unfortunately, all of the countries in this sample had 
some form of financial repression in place during the period, according to Williamson 
and Mahar (1998).  In lieu of data on internal market rates, I now consider the plausibility 
of this alternative assumption that *r r< . 
The autarky interest rate is an equilibrium outcome of domestic savings and 
investment.  Historically, a number of emerging Asian countries have had very high 
savings rates relative to developed countries (Collins and Bosworth, 1996; Young, 1995; 
Kim and Lau, 1994).  If it has a high autarky savings rate, it is plausible that a poor 
country might have a lower autarky risk-free rate than the world risk-free rate.  On the 
other hand, economies with high-savings rates may also have more attractive investment 
opportunities.  Thus, it is not clear that high savings-rate countries will necessarily have 
autarky interest rates that are lower than the world rate.  Even if its autarky risk-free rate 
is lower than the world rate, the liberalizing country may still experience a net capital 
inflow if its stock market liberalization is asymmetric in the sense that foreign portfolio 
inflows are liberalized, but the outflow of domestic residents’ savings is still subject to 
barriers.  Section 4 provides evidence on both stock market liberalization and restrictions 
on the outflow of residents’ savings. 
The central message from this discussion, then, is not that stock market 
liberalization will in all cases lead to a fall in a country’s cost of capital.  Rather, the point 
is that there are sound theoretical reasons to believe that stock market liberalization may 
change the liberalizing country’s cost of capital, with attendant implications for physical 
investment.  Ultimately, whether a country’s cost of capital rises or falls following stock 
 16 
 
 
market liberalization is an empirical question that must be considered case by case.  
Evidence on this question is presented in the next section. 
A second objection to the theoretical framework is that it assumes that expected 
profits do not change when the stock market is liberalized.  To the extent that stock 
market liberalizations are correlated with events that improve a country’s physical 
investment opportunity set, this assumption is clearly unrealistic.  Section 6 addresses this 
potential correlation by employing a detailed set of economic reform variables.  Other 
possible omitted variables that could lead to higher investment, absent any impact of 
liberalization on the cost of capital, are also considered there. 
 
4. Stock market liberalization, stock prices, and investment: facts 
This section of the paper describes the data and presents the facts that are central 
to the subsequent empirical analysis of investment and stock market liberalization in the 
following set of countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, The Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela.   
 
4.1. Stock market liberalization dates 
 
Evaluating the growth rate of private investment following a country’s first stock 
market liberalization requires a systematic procedure for identifying the date of each 
country’s initial stock market liberalization.  Official policy decree dates are used when 
they are available.  When policy decree dates are not available, two alternatives are 
pursued.  First, many countries initially permitted foreign ownership through country 
mutual funds.  Since government permission is presumably a necessary condition for 
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establishing these funds, the date when the first country fund is established is taken as a 
proxy for the official implementation date.  The second method for indirectly capturing 
official implementation dates is to monitor the IFC’s Investability Index.  The 
investability index is the ratio of the market capitalization of stocks that foreigners can 
legally hold to total market capitalization.  A large jump in the investability index is taken 
as evidence of an official liberalization.  The date of a country’s first stock market 
liberalization is defined as the first month with a verifiable occurrence of any of the 
following: liberalization by policy decree, establishment of the first country fund, or an 
increase in the investability index of at least 10%.   
Column 2 of Table 1 lists the date on which each of the 11 countries first 
liberalized its stock market.  Column 3 of Table 1 provides details on the means by which 
each country liberalized.  In particular, where the initial stock market liberalization is 
through a country fund, the specific name of the country fund is given.  Table 1 also 
provides two indicators of whether these countries had restrictions on capital outflows at 
the time they liberalized foreign capital inflows into their stock markets.  Column 4, 
which bears the label, “Restrictions on capital transactions using resident-owned funds?” 
provides the first indicator.  A ‘Yes’ entry under this column indicates that according to 
the International Monetary Fund’s Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 
restrictions on the use of domestic residents’ funds for capital transactions were still in 
place when the country’s stock market was liberalized to the inward flow of foreign 
capital.  Column 5, which bears the label, “Restrictions on domestic residents’ ability to 
own foreign securities?” provides the second indicator.  A ‘Yes’ entry under this column 
indicates that according to Kim and Singal (2000) there were restrictions on domestic 
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residents’ ability to purchase foreign securities when the country’s stock market was 
liberalized to the inward flow of foreign capital.   
A central point is that Column 4 indicates that every country in Table 1 had 
restrictions on the outflow of domestic savings at the time its stock market was 
liberalized.  According to Column 5, 8 of 11 countries had restrictions on capital 
outflows.  Thus, even if these countries had autarky risk-free rates that were lower than 
the world risk-free rate, it is reasonable to expect these countries to have experienced net 
capital inflows following their stock market liberalizations.  The simple valuation model 
in Section 3 predicts that a net capital inflow should have increased stock market 
valuations and reduced the cost of equity capital for these countries.  Section 4.2 
examines whether the data support this prediction. 
 
4.2. Risk sharing, valuation, and liquidity changes around liberalization 
This subsection summarizes the existing evidence on the impact of stock market 
liberalization on risk sharing, aggregate valuation and liquidity.  Stulz (1999a, 1999b) 
argues that analyzing stock market returns around the time of a change in the capital 
account regime of a country can provide the best picture of the impact of capital account 
liberalization on risk sharing and the cost of capital.  If the liberalization is anticipated, 
then the change in valuation will occur prior to the actual implementation.  As a crude 
indicator of the valuation response in anticipation of liberalization, column 6 of Table 1 
documents the real percentage change in each country’s stock market over the 12 months 
leading up to the implementation month of the first stock market liberalization for each 
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country.5  For example, for a country that first liberalized in December of 1991, the 
percentage change shown in Table 1 gives the percentage change in the dollar total return 
index from December 1990 to December 1991. 
While the numbers in Table 1 do not account for contemporaneous reforms or 
changes in fundamentals, they suggest large changes in aggregate valuation associated 
with stock market liberalization.  Henry (2000) shows that, after controlling for economic 
reforms, macroeconomic fundamentals, and co-movements with developed-country stock 
markets, the valuation increases shown in Table 1 remain large and statistically 
significant.  Kim and Singal (2000) and Bekaert and Harvey (2000) find similar effects, 
and argue that the numbers are consistent with a one-time revaluation of aggregate equity 
prices and a fall in the cost of capital.  The countries analyzed in this paper are identical 
to those in Henry (2000), except that Taiwan is not included in this study, because private 
investment data were not available for Taiwan.  While the evidence on valuation and the 
cost of capital is consistent with the hypothesis that stock market liberalization increases 
risk sharing, Levine and Zervos (1998b) document that stock market liberalization also 
increases market liquidity.  Therefore, the documented changes in valuation could be due 
to increased liquidity as well as increased risk sharing. 
 
4.3. Private investment data 
The private investment series comes from the World Bank’s Socioeconomic Time 
Series Access and Retrieval (STARS) database.  The level of real private invesment was 
                                                           
5 For a detailed discussion of the issues involved in trying to precisely date liberalization announcements, 
see Henry (2000). 
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obtained by dividing nominal private investment by the GDP deflator.  There are a total of 
11 developing countries that have both liberalized their stock market and kept data on 
private investment.  Table 2, which presents summary statistics on the growth rate of real 
private investment for each country, illustrates that the sample contains a total of 151 
observations of private investment.  Although there are a total of 151 private investment 
observations, it is important to note that world-wide shocks can affect all 11 countries, 
which means that these observations may not be completely independent.  The empirical 
analysis presented below controls for world-wide shocks by using dummy variables for 
each calendar year as well as other proxies for the world business cycle. 
 
4.4. The growth rate of private investment around stock market liberalization 
Let 1ln ln lnit it itI I I −∆ = −  be the growth rate of real private investment in 
country i  in year t .  Further, let 
11
1
1ln ( ln )
11t iti
I I
=
∆ = ∆  be the average growth rate of 
real private investment across all 11 countries in year t .  Finally, let *T  denote the year 
in which the stock market is liberalized.  Under these definitions of ln tI∆  and 
*T , the 
expression ∆ ln *IT  refers to the average growth rate of private investment across all 11 
countries in the year of stock market liberalization.  Figure 1, which is a plot of tIln∆  for 
* *[ 5, 5]t T T∈ − + , suggests a strong lagged response of private investment growth to 
stock market liberalization.  The growth rate of private investment increases sharply in 
year * 1T + , peaks in year * 2T + , and returns to pre-liberalization magnitudes by year 
* 4T + . 
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The correlation between liberalization and the growth rate of private investment at 
various dates is evaluated by estimating the following panel regression:  
1 2 3 4ln( ) 1 2 3
.
it i it it it it
it it
I Lib PostLib PostLib PostLib
Year
α β β β β
ε
∆ = + + + +
+ +
               (5) 
Libi  is a variable that equals one in the year that country i  liberalizes its stock market.  
PostLib i1  takes on the value 1 in the first year after liberalization, PostLib i2  takes on the 
value 1 in the second year after liberalization, and iPostLib3  takes on the value 1 in the 
third year after liberalization.  The iα  in Eq. (5) denote country-specific dummy 
variables.  The itYear  denote year-specific dummy variables which are included to control 
for cross-country correlation in the error terms that might be induced by common world-
wide shocks.  The estimation procedure explicitly allows for heteroskedacity in 
computing standard errors, but with an unbalanced panel it is not possible to relax the 
assumption of no cross-country correlation.  The year dummies are an imperfect attempt 
to control for cross-country correlation.  The first-difference specification reflects a well-
known problem of empirical investment equations, the presence of a highly serially 
correlated error term when these equations are run in levels.  The usual first difference 
specification relates ln( / )t tI K∆  to stock returns (see Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers, 
1993), but data on the stock of capital for each country are not available.  Hence, the 
analysis throughout the paper follows Barro (1990) in using ∆ ln( )It  as the left-hand-side 
variable.  The results are presented in Table 3. 
The second row of Table 3 illustrates that the average growth rate of private 
investment is 23 percentage points above the sample mean in the first year after stock 
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market liberalization, 27 percentage points in the second year, and 17 percentage points in 
the third year.  Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are given in parentheses.  
Although the liberalization effects appear large and significant, there are three concerns.  
First, in spite of the first difference specification, subsequent observations of investment 
growth in individual countries might be autocorrelated.  Second, with 11 countries in the 
sample, one might worry that the results are driven by one or two large outliers.  Finally, 
although the estimates control for country-specific effects and common world-wide 
shocks, the right-hand side of the estimated equation may be missing other important 
variables that exert an influence on private investment.  Each of these issues is now 
discussed. 
Two procedures were used to evaluate whether autocorrelated disturbance terms 
are corrupting the significance levels reported in Table 3.  First, individual country 
regressions of private investment growth on a constant were performed to test for first-
order autocorrelation in the residuals.  For 7 of 11 countries the Durbin-Watson statistic 
indicated that there was no first-order serial correlation, and for the other 4 countries the 
Durbin-Watson statistic was inconclusive.6  Second, Eq. (5) was re-estimated using 
feasible generalized least squares (FGLS), which allows for groupwise autocorrelation.  
The FGLS estimates of Eq. (5) are reported in the third row of Table 3.  The mean growth 
rates of private investment in years T*+1, T*+2, and T*+3 are 16, 29, and 19 percentage 
points above the sample mean, respectively.  All three estimates are significant at the 1% 
                                                           
6 The 7 countries and the associated Durbin-Watson statistics are as follows: Argentina (2.76), Brazil 
(1.85), Chile (2.80), India (2.12), The Philippines (2.04), Thailand (2.17), and Venezuela (2.01).  The 4 
countries, with their Durbin-Watson statistics in parentheses, are Colombia (1.39), Korea (1.51), Malaysia 
(1.21), and Mexico (1.51). 
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level.  The similarity of the FGLS estimates shown in the third row of Table 3 to the 
estimates in the second row of Table 3, in both magnitude and statistical significance, 
suggests that autocorrelation is not a major statistical concern. 
In order to address the concern about outliers, the fourth row of Table 3 presents 
the results of a Wilcoxon signed rank test.  Specifically, each country’s growth rate of 
private investment in years T*, T*+1, T*+2, and T*+3 is compared to that country’s 
median growth rate of private investment in non-liberalization years.  The Z-statistics 
reject the hypothesis that the median growth rate of private investment during years T*+1, 
T*+2, and T*+3 is equal to the median growth rate in non-liberalization years.  The fifth 
row of the table gives the results of a simple sign test.  It lists the number of countries 
with a growth rate of private investment below their country-specific median growth rate, 
and gives the probability of finding at most this number of countries below their median.  
Like row 4, row 5 of Table 3 demonstrates that the abnormally high growth rate of private 
investment in each of the three years immediately following stock market liberalization is 
a robust empirical regularity not driven by a few countries.  Finally, the concern that the 
estimates in Table 3 are overstated because of omitted variables is deferred until Section 
6, where alternative controls for world-wide factors and a host of other possible omitted 
variables are considered.   
 
4.5 Foreign direct investment  
Another question that arises from looking at Figure 1 and Table 3 is whether the 
increase in private investment simply replaces FDI, or whether both increase, following 
stock market liberalization.  This question is addressed by looking at the ratio of foreign 
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direct investment to private investment.  Table 4 presents summary statistics on the ratio 
of foreign direct investment to private investment.  The numbers indicate that the ratio of 
FDI to private investment tends to rise following stock market liberalization.  In year 
T*+1, 7 of 11 countries have a ratio of FDI to private investment in excess of their 
country-specific median.  In years T*+2 and T*+3, this fraction is 8 of 11 and 9 of 11, 
respectively. 
These numbers suggest that the increase in private investment does not simply 
substitute for FDI.  Following stock market liberalization, private investment increases, 
the ratio of FDI to private investment increases, and therefore the sum of private 
investment and FDI increases.  One explanation for why FDI increases is that stock 
market liberalization may be positively correlated with other changes that reduce the 
operating risk of foreign multinationals operating in an LDC.  In this case, the cost of 
capital for multinationals may also fall.  Holding the cost of capital for multinationals 
constant, FDI may also increase if stock market liberalization is positively correlated with 
other economic reforms that increase the expected future cash flows from domestic 
investment.  The possibility that FDI rises because of higher expected future cash flows 
reinforces the concern that the magnitude of the private investment-liberalization 
correlations in Table 3 may be overstated.  Again, Section 6 of the paper directly 
addresses these issues. 
 
5. Investment-stock return correlations 
As outlined in Eq. (1), the theory predicts that, if stock market liberalization 
reduces the cost of capital, it will also cause higher investment via its intermediate effect 
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on aggregate stock market prices.  The correlations documented in Section 4 provide 
support for this transmission mechanism.  However, the ultimate validity of this theory 
requires the existence of an intermediate empirical link from stock prices to investment.  
This section of the paper examines whether such a link exists.  
Figure 2 is a graph of annual stock returns and the annual growth rate of private 
investment in all 11 countries from 1977 to 1994.  The solid line, which is plotted against 
the left-hand y-axis scale, is the simple average of the continuously compounded real 
local currency stock market return across all 11 countries.  The stock returns are 
constructed using the dividend-inclusive, local currency IFC Global Index taken from the 
International Finance Corporation’s Emerging Markets Data Base (EMDB).  All stock 
market indexes are deflated by consumer price indexes from the International Monetary 
Fund’s International Financial Statistics.  The dashed line, which is plotted against the 
right-hand y-axis, is the simple average of the continuously compounded growth rate of 
real private investment. 
Figure 2 suggests that there are two components to the correlation between the 
stock market and investment.  First, there is a cross-sectional component.  In any given 
year, the stock market and investment tend to move in the same direction.  Second, there 
is a time series component.  Both investment and stock returns were higher after 1983, as 
the world economy moved out of recession.  As in Section 4, this observation means that, 
although there are a total of 151 data points, they may not be completely independent.  
Again, the estimation procedure controls for the possible cross-country correlation 
induced by common world shocks by using year-specific dummy variables. 
Let Iit  and Vit  denote the real local currency value of private investment and the 
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stock market index in country i  in year t .  Also, let v Vit it= ∆ ln( ) .  The correlation 
between private investment and stock returns is evaluated by estimating panel regressions 
that allow for country-specific and time-specific effects: 
 
1ln( )it i it n it itI v Yearα β ε−∆ = + + + .                                                                            (6) 
 
The growth rate of private investment is regressed on contemporaneous stock returns, 
one-year lagged stock returns, and two-year lagged stock returns.7  Investment is also 
regressed on all three lagged variables simultaneously.  Regressions (1) through (4) in 
Table 5 indicate a positive correlation between stock returns and private investment.  The 
relationship is strongest between investment and one-year lagged returns.  The coefficient 
on 1tv −  is 0.13.  A 1% increase in the stock market last year is followed by a 0.13% 
increase in the growth rate of private investment.  Neither the contemporaneous return on 
the market, tv , or the two-year lagged change in the value of the stock market, vt−2 , are 
significantly correlated with investment in year t.  Column 4 shows that estimating the 
relationship with all three return variables entering simultaneously yields the same 
conclusion.  Stock returns in year 1−t  strongly predict investment in year t , while 
contemporaneous and two-year lagged returns have little predictive power. 
 
5.1. Investment and liberalization-specific valuation changes 
 
It is natural to ask whether the correlation between investment and generic 
                                                           
7 The use of stock returns as a proxy for changes in q is another difference between this specification and 
those in the literature on investment in developed countries.  The reason for this difference is that the debt 
variables needed to construct an aggregate measure of q are not available.  This is not a major concern, as 
Barro (1990) and Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1993) both find that lagged stock market returns out-
perform q as a predictor of future real investment. 
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changes in market valuation, as presented in Columns 1 through 4 of Table 5, is the same 
as the correlation between investment and liberalization-specific changes in valuation.  
Estimating the following equation provides the most transparent means of answering that 
question: 
1 2 2 1 3 4 2
5 1 6
ln( ) ( * 2 )
( * 1 ) ( * )
it i it it it it i
it i it i it
I v v v v PostLib
v PostLib v Lib
α β β β β
β β ε
− − −
−
∆ = + + + +
+ + +
                                (7) 
 
The interactive coefficients measure the correlation of investment in year t  with a 
liberalization-specific valuation increase that took place in year nt − .  If there is no 
difference in the responsiveness of private investment to liberalization-specific and 
generic valuation increases, then we should observe the following relations among the 
coefficients: 1 4β β= , 2 5β β= , 3 6β β= . 
The results are presented in Column 5 of Table 5.  4β , the coefficient on the 
interactive term, 2*2 −tvPostLib , is positive and significant and a simple F-test reveals 
that it is statistically larger than the coefficient on vt−2 .
8  Whereas a generic 1% increase 
in the stock market in year 2−t  has little or negative predictive power for investment in 
year t , there is a positive and significant investment response in year t  to a 1% increase 
in year 2−t  that is associated with stock market liberalization.  The fact that investment 
is more strongly correlated with liberalization-induced valuation increases than with 
generic valuation increases lends itself to two possible interpretations.  First, stock market 
liberalization helps firms distinguish between news-driven and noise-driven valuation 
increases.  Second, there is an omitted variable problem.  Each of these interpretations is 
___________ 
 
8 The F value is 5.25.  Probability > F = 0.024. 
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now considered. 
A firm observing a typical increase in its stock price doesn’t know whether that 
increase is due to news or noise (Stein, 1996).  Undertaking new physical investment in 
response to noise-driven valuation increases will make long-term shareholders worse off, 
because such investment drives down the marginal product of capital without an 
accompanying fall in the discount rate or an increase in expected future profits 
(Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers, 1993).  However, when the stock market is liberalized, 
firms know that a change in the country’s fundamentals has occurred.  Namely, increased 
risk sharing is present.  The attendant equity price boom signals to firms that they can 
increase shareholder welfare by investing in new capital.9 
Investment may also be more strongly correlated with changes in valuation 
induced by the occurrence of liberalization than with generic valuation changes, because 
regression (5) of Table 5 is missing variables that are positively correlated with both 
liberalization and investment.  Call this vector of variables Z .  If stock market 
liberalizations coincide with positive shocks to Z , then subsequent investment will 
appear more highly correlated with valuation changes induced by liberalization, when in 
fact the omitted variable Z  may be driving the increased capital formation.  Possible 
omitted variables are the subject of Section 6. 
 
5.2. Investment and liquidity 
___________ 
 
9The mechanism through which greater risk sharing increases investment in my example is identical to the 
mechanism driving Fischer and Merton’s (1984) managers to decrease investment following an increase in 
aggregate risk aversion.  Greater risk sharing also leads to increased investment in Obstfeld (1994). 
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The discussion in Section 3 explained why liquidity and risk sharing have 
observationally equivalent valuation implications.  This fact raises an important 
interpretation issue.  Suppose we observe that a stock market liberalization generates a 
large increase in equity prices and a subsequent investment boom.  It would be useful to 
know how much of the investment increase is due to increased risk sharing versus 
increased liquidity.  Because increased risk sharing and increased liquidity both have 
valuation implications, we cannot disentangle their relative effects on investment by 
running horse races between changes in liquidity and changes in valuation.  However, 
Levine and Zervos (1998a) argue that regressing investment on liquidity and valuation 
may help us understand whether liquidity has an impact on investment that operates 
independently of the impact of liquidity on valuation.   
The absence of a significant coefficient on liquidity in a regression of investment 
growth on changes in valuation and changes in liquidity would suggest that all of the 
effect of increased liquidity on investment works through the impact of liquidity on 
valuation.  On the other hand, suppose a positive and significant correlation between 
investment and liquidity appears after controlling for valuation.  Then, to the extent that 
stock market liberalization enhances liquidity, it is possible that part of the investment 
increase following stock market liberalization works through a liquidity channel that 
operates independently of the effect of liquidity on valuation.   
Table 6 presents results from regressing the growth rate of private investment on 
contemporaneous and lagged changes in valuation and the measures of liquidity used in 
Levine and Zervos (1998a).  The two measures of liquidity are the change in the turnover 
ratio, and the change in value of shares traded as a fraction of GDP.  The final 
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specification (4), which includes contemporaneous values, lagged values, and two-year 
lagged values of all three variables, is perhaps the most informative.  The fact that the 
two-year lagged change in the turnover variable remains significant in the presence of 
contemporaneous, lagged, and two-year lagged changes in valuation suggests that 
increased liquidity may lead to increased investment through a channel that operates 
independently of the effect of liquidity on valuation.  This result is consistent with Levine 
and Zervos (1998a), who find that increased liquidity leads to higher capital stock growth 
after controlling for valuation.  
 
6. Alternative explanations for the investment boom 
Thus far, this paper has documented three salient facts about the stock market and 
private investment in developing countries.  First, private investment booms follow stock 
market liberalizations.  Second, there is a strong positive correlation between the growth 
rate of private investment and changes in stock market valuation.  Third, this correlation 
is stronger for liberalization-specific valuation changes than for generic valuation 
changes.  Taken together with previous work that demonstrates that stock market 
liberalizations cause large increases in stock market valuation, these three facts constitute 
strong prima facie evidence that stock market liberalizations cause investment booms.  
This section of the paper argues that there are reasons to be skeptical of this evidence. 
 
6.1.  Omitted variables 
At least one possible alternative explanation for the temporary surge in the growth 
rate of private investment is that LDC policymakers timed the liberalizations to coincide 
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with high points in the world business cycle.  In the estimations that follow, in addition to 
using year dummies, real U.S. interest rates and OECD output growth rates are used to 
separate the cross-sectional effects of stock market liberalization from the impact of the 
world business cycle. 
Overstating the impact of stock market liberalization on private investment could 
also occur because of the contemporaneous implementation of other economic reforms.  
Table 7 documents the major economic reforms occurring in each of the 11 countries 
between 1985 and 1994.  The major economic reforms documented in Table 7 are the 
occurrences of: 1) macroeconomic stabilization programs, 2) trade liberalization, 3) 
privatization programs, and 4) easing of exchange controls.  With only two exceptions, 
the sample countries implemented all four types of reforms during the period 1985-1994.  
The two exceptions are Malaysia, where no stabilizations were attempted, and Mexico, 
where exchange controls were not eased during this period.  The data for Table 7 are 
taken from Henry (1999).  With the aid of this table, four economic reform variables are 
created to help isolate the effects of stock market liberalization.  These variables, which 
are given the names Stabilize, Trade, Privatize, and Exchange, take on a value of zero in 
all years except those years in which each of these reforms actually occur in each country.  
Like the Liberalize variable, 3 lags of each of the reform variables are also included in 
each of the regressions. 
In addition to controlling for the world business cycle and contemporaneous 
reforms, it is important to account for domestic fundamentals, such as the growth rate of 
GDP, the terms of trade, and the external debt-to-GDP ratio.  For any country, more rapid 
GDP growth or a positive terms of trade shock could lead to stronger sales and higher 
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profits.  One possible outcome of such a scenario is a private investment boom driven by 
an aggregate demand shock that is independent of stock market liberalization policies.  
Similarly, the literature on debt overhang and investment (Krugman, 1989; Sachs, 1989) 
argues that a large external debt-to-GDP ratio acts as a drag on investment.  Therefore, a 
large fall in the external debt-to-GDP ratio could also lead to a substantial increase in 
future investment that is unrelated to stock market liberalization.  
To account for these potentially important omitted variables, the following 
regression controls for world business cycle effects, contemporaneous economic reforms, 
and aggregate demand conditions as follows: 
 
1 2 3 4ln( ) 1 2 3
.
it i it it it
it it it
I Lib PostLib PostLib PostLib BCYCLE
Reforms Fundamentals
α β β β β
ε
∆ = + + + + +
+ + +
          (8) 
 
 
BCYCLE  is an abbreviation for the variables that serve as proxies for the world business 
cycle: year dummies, the real U.S. Treasury bill rate, and the logarithmic growth rate of 
OECD industrial production.  The term Reforms  denotes the matrix of reform variables.  
The Fundamentals are two lags of the growth rate of GDP, the contemporaneous growth 
rate of the terms of trade, and the contemporaneous growth rate of the external debt-to-
GDP ratio.  Further lags of the growth rate of GDP contribute very little explanatory 
power and were therefore dropped.  Lagged values of the terms of trade and the debt-to-
GDP ratio were dropped for the same reason.  Contemporaneous GDP growth is not 
included on the right-hand side to avoid simultaneity bias.  Including lagged GDP growth 
as a right-hand-side variable could introduce the same bias if serial correlation in the error 
term exists.  However, the tests in Section 4 provide no evidence that there is serial 
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correlation in the error term.  The final specification closely resembles Fischer (1991), 
Warner (1992), and Cohen (1993). 
 Table 8 presents the results of three different variations on Eq. (8).  The first 
specification uses year dummies as the sole proxy for the business cycle.  The second 
specification uses the real Treasury bill rate and the growth rate of OECD industrial 
production.  The third specification uses all three world business cycle measures.  In order 
to conserve space, the estimates of the business cycle variables and fundamentals are not 
presented in the table.10  Column 2 shows that when year dummies and fundamentals are 
included, the coefficient on 1PostLib  falls to 0.10 and is no longer significant.  The 
coefficients on 2PostLib  and 3PostLib  actually increase to 0.33 and 0.20, respectively.  
It is interesting to note that the growth rate of private investment is also significantly 
higher than the sample mean in the years following a number of the other reforms.  For 
example, the coefficients on all of the Stabilize variables are positive, and the coefficients 
of 0.22 on Stabilize1 and 0.17 on Stabilize3 are both statistically significant.  The 
direction of the relationship between private investment growth and the other reforms is 
less robust.  The coefficients on Trade2, Privatize2, and Exchange2 are all positive and 
statistically significant, but the coefficients on Trade1, Trade3, Privatize, Privatize3, and 
Exchange are all negative. 
The regression in Column 3 of Table 8 controls for world business cycle effects 
by including the contemporaneous value of the real U.S. Treasury bill rate and the growth 
rate of OECD industrial production as right-hand-side variables.  Under this specification, 
                                                           
10 Notable points about these estimates are that the year dummies in the early 80s are negative and 
significant, reflecting the effects of the Volcker recession.  The Treasury bill rate and OECD industrial 
production variables have the expected a priori signs. 
 34 
 
 
the coefficient on 2PostLib  is 0.24, again significant at the 1% level.  The coefficient on 
3PostLib  falls to 0.10, but remains significant.  The reform variable coefficients are 
qualitatively identical to those of the specification in Column 2.  Multiple leads and lags 
of the interest rate and growth rate of industrial production were also tried, but only the 
contemporaneous values displayed any significant effect.  As a final check of robustness, 
year dummies, the real Treasury bill rate, and OECD growth rates were all included 
simultaneously.  The estimates are presented in Column 4.  For this specification, 
PostLib1, PostLib2, and PostLib3 are all statistically significant, with point estimates 
almost identical to those in Column 2.   
The evidence in Table 8 demonstrates that the positive correlation between private 
investment growth and stock market liberalization is robust to a number of potential 
omitted variables, but should still be interpreted with caution.  Although Table 8 
documents a number of significant reforms, it does not directly capture elements such as 
judicial reform or public sector accountability changes.  These changes may be 
prerequisites for a successful stock market liberalization in any country.  To the extent 
that the stock market liberalization dummy variable inadvertently captures such changes, 
the estimated impact of liberalization on investment may still be overstated.   
 
6.2. Reverse causality 
The evidence in Table 8 demonstrates that the effect of stock market liberalization 
on investment is reasonably robust to the omitted variable critique, but it does not directly 
address the concern that causality might literally run in the opposite direction.  There are 
at least two possible stories as to why the direction of causation might be reversed.  First, 
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governments might liberalize their countries’ stock markets in response to abnormally 
high investment demand in previous years.  Second, policymakers might liberalize their 
countries’ stock markets in anticipation of positive future shocks to the marginal 
productivity of capital.  In the absence of suitable instrumental variables for stock market 
liberalization, timing evidence is used to evaluate the plausibility of these two stories. 
If past investment booms cause stock market liberalizations, then we should see 
liberalizations following surges in private investment.  The evidence presented in Figure 
1 is not consistent with this first story of reverse causality.  Figure 1 is, however, 
consistent with the second story of reverse causality.  Suppose that policymakers 
liberalize their stock markets because they correctly anticipate that the marginal 
productivity of capital will be higher in the future.  In this case, the growth rate of private 
investment will rise following stock market liberalization, but the liberalizations clearly 
do not cause the increase.  The future increase in the marginal productivity of capital 
causes both the liberalization and the investment boom. 
The fact that we cannot rule out reverse causality calls for a measured 
interpretation of the evidence in Table 8.  This sample is somewhat special, because the 
universe of developing countries that liberalized their stock markets did so after 
beginning the process of economic reform, and at a time of relatively low real world 
interest rates.  Suppose, at some point in the future a developing country were to 
liberalize its stock market before implementing other reforms, at a time when the world 
cost of capital is relatively high.  In that case, it is not clear that the liberalizing country 
would see investment effects on the same order of magnitude as the countries in this 
sample. 
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The general implication, then, is not that stock market liberalizations cause 
investment booms.  Rather, the following seems like a more reasonable summary of the 
evidence.  In environments where the marginal product of capital is high and the domestic 
cost of capital exceeds the world cost of capital, theory predicts that capital account 
liberalization can lead to large increases in investment.  The data presented here are 
consistent with this prediction. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper demonstrates that the developing countries in this sample experienced 
abnormally high growth rates of private investment after liberalizing their stock markets.  
Because it is possible that exogenous decreases in the world cost of capital and expected 
shocks to the future marginal productivity of domestic capital could cause both the 
investment booms and the liberalizations, we cannot necessarily conclude that stock 
market liberalizations cause investment booms.  Nevertheless, the evidence presented 
here is relevant for the debate on whether or not capital account liberalization has any 
effect on real investment.  
Previous papers tested the hypothesis that capital account liberalization has 
permanent effects on investment, and found no supporting evidence.  However, standard 
models predict that capital account liberalization will cause a temporary increase in the 
growth rate of investment.  This paper uses event study techniques to examine whether 
the data are consistent with this theoretical prediction.  The fact that stock market 
liberalizations are consistently followed by a temporary increase in the growth rate of real 
private investment that cannot be explained by world business cycle effects, 
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contemporaneous economic reforms, or domestic aggregate demand conditions suggests 
that capital account liberalization may matter for investment after all. 
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Table 1 
First stock market liberalization and controls on capital outflows 
 
The stock market liberalization dates are based on information obtained from the following sources: Levine and Zervos (1994), The Wilson Directory of Emerging Market Funds, 
IFC Investable Indexes, Park and Van Agtmael (1993), Price (1994), The Economist Intelligence Unit (various issues), The Economist Guide to World Stock Markets (1988), the 
IMF’s Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (various issues).  Percentage change in total return index is calculated as the percentage change in the real dollar value 
of the IFC’s total return index over the 12-month period leading up to the country’s initial stock market liberalization.  Restrictions on capital transactions using resident-owned 
funds: a ‘Yes’ entry under this column indicates that according to the International Monetary Fund’s Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, restrictions on the use of 
domestic residents’ funds for capital transactions were still in place when the country’s stock market was liberalized to the inward flow of foreign capital.  Restrictions on domestic 
residents’ ability to own foreign securities are as catalogued by Kim and Singal (2000).  *According to the table entitled, “Summary features of exchange and trade systems in 
member countries” (IMF Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 1987, p. 557), Malaysia had no restrictions on the use of resident-owned domestic funds.  However, 
the discussion on page 333 of the same publication, which lists the rules governing capital flows in and out of Malaysia, indicates that there were some restrictions on capital 
outflows. 
 
 
 
Country 
 
 
Date of First Stock 
Market 
Liberalization 
 
 
 
Details About the Liberalization 
Restrictions on 
capital transactions 
using resident-
owned funds? 
Restrictions on 
domestic residents’ 
ability to own 
foreign securities? 
 
 
Percentage change 
in total return index 
Argentina November 1989 Policy Decree: The Liberalization began with 
the New Foreign Investment Regime in 
November 1989.  Legal limits on the type and 
nature of foreign investments were reduced 
(Park and Van Agtmael, 1993, p. 326). 
Yes Yes 98.7 
      
Brazil March 1988 Country Fund Introduction: “The Brazil 
Fund Incorporated” (The Wilson Directory of 
Emerging Market Funds, p. 17). 
Yes Yes 19.6 
      
Chile May 1987 Country Fund Introduction: “The Toronto 
Trust Mutual Fund” (The Wilson Directory of 
Emerging Market Funds, p. 17). 
Yes Yes 39.6 
      
Colombia December 1991 Policy Decree: Resolution 52 allowed foreign 
investors to purchase up to 100% of locally 
listed companies (Price, 1994). 
Yes Yes 109 
      
India June 1986 Country Fund Introduction: “The India 
Fund” (The Wilson Directory of Emerging 
Market Funds, p. 12). 
Yes Yes 53.1 
      
Korea June 1987 Country Fund Introduction: “The Korea 
Europe Fund Limited” (The Wilson Directory 
of Emerging Market Funds, p. 13). 
Yes Yes 27.7 
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Malaysia May 1987 Country Fund Introduction: “The Wardley 
GS Malaysia Fund” (The Wilson Directory of 
Emerging Market Funds, p. 14). 
Yes* No 62.5 
      
      
Mexico May 1989 Policy Decree: Restrictions on foreign 
portfolio inflows were substantially liberalized 
(Levine and Zervos, 1994). 
Yes No 30.7 
      
The  
Philippines 
May 1986 Country Fund Introduction: “The Thornton 
Philippines Redevelopment Fund Limited” 
(The Wilson Directory of Emerging Market 
Funds, p. 15). 
Yes Yes 72.9 
      
Thailand January 1988 Country Fund Introduction: “The Siam 
Fund Limited” (The Wilson Directory of 
Emerging Market Funds, p. 16). 
Yes Yes 41.6 
      
Venezuela January 1990 Policy Decree: Decree 727 completely opens 
the market to foreign investors except for bank 
stocks (Levine and Zervos, 1994). 
Yes No 32.5 
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Table 2 
The growth rate of real private investment: summary statistics  
 
The numbers in columns 3 through 6 are the growth rate of real private investment in the year of liberalization, the year after liberalization, the second year 
after liberalization, and the third year after liberalization, respectively.  Columns 7 through 11 give the sample mean, median, minimum, maximum, and 
standard deviation of the growth rate of real investment, respectively.  The level of real private investment was obtained by dividing nominal private 
investment by the GDP deflator.  The growth rate of real private investment is calculated as the change in the natural log of the level of real private 
investment.  The last Source:  The World Bank’s Stars database and the author’s calculations. 
 
Country 
 
Date of 
Liberalization  
 
 
T* 
 
 
T*+1 
 
 
T*+2 
 
 
T*+3 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
Median 
 
 
St. Dev 
 
 
Min 
 
 
Max 
Years 
data are 
available 
            
Argentina November 1989 -0.376 
 
0.062 
 
0.309 
 
0.601 0.113 0.143 0.277 -0.376 0.601 1985-93 
            
Brazil March 1988 0.313 
 
0.145 
 
0.402 
 
-0.161 0.034 -0.029 0.200 -0.281 0.402 1981-93 
            
Chile May 1987 0.063 
 
0.269 
 
0.376 
 
0.102 0.117 0.167 0.327 -0.495 0.742 1983-93 
            
Colombia December 1991 -0.078 
 
0.123 
 
0.292 
 
0.416 0.110 0.022 0.192 -0.156 0.496 1985-94 
            
India June 1986 0.031 
 
0.265 
 
0.062 
 
0.111 0.083 0.121 0.143 -0.328 0.269 1977-92 
            
Korea June 1987 0.260 
 
0.222 
 
0.259 0.275 0.161 0.096 0.158 -0.167 0.452 1977-93 
            
Malaysia May 1987 0.098 
 
0.200 
 
0.272 
 
0.245 0.123 0.064 0.159 -0.221 0.365 1977-93 
            
Mexico May 1989 0.120 
 
0.196 
 
0.241 
 
0.248 0.079 0.124 0.093 -0.480 0.357 1980-94 
            
Philippines May 1986 -0.011 
 
0.084 
 
0.219 
 
0.263 0.085 0.144 0.183 -0.354 0.289 1977-94 
            
Thailand January 1988 0.367 
 
0.301 
 
0.310 
 
0.145 0.153 0.104 0.132 -0.166 0.367 1977-94 
            
Venezuela January 1990 -0.411 0.608 0.141 0.006 -0.066 -0.149 0.545 -0.960 1.52 1977-94 
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Table 3 
The growth rate of private investment around countries’ first stock market liberalization 
 
Mean, Huber estimates: the coefficient on a dummy variable for each of the years T*, T*+1, T*+2, and T*+3 in a regression of the 
growth rate of private investment on a constant, 10 country-specific dummies, and year dummies.  The constant term is not shown.  
The t-statistics are calculated using heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors.  Mean, FGLS estimates: the coefficient on a dummy 
variable for each of the years T*, T*+1, T*+2, and T*+3 in a feasible generalized least squares regression of the growth rate of private 
investment on a constant, 10 country-specific dummies, and year dummies.  The constant term is not shown.  Wilcoxon Test: This is a 
test of the hypothesis that the sample of private investment growth rates in each of the years T*, T*+1, T*+2, and T*+3 have the same 
distribution as the non-stock market liberalization sample of private investment growth rates.  Number Below Median: The number of 
countries with a growth rate of private investment below the non-liberalization median growth rate of investment in each of the years 
T*, T*+1, T*+2, and T*+3.  P-value: the 2-sided p-value of observing at most this many countries with private investment growth 
rates, in each of the years T*, T*+1, T*+2, and T*+3, below their non-stock market-liberalization median growth rate of private 
investment. 
  
T* 
 
T*+1 
 
T*+2 
 
T*+3 
Number of 
Liberalizations 
 
 
11 11 11 11 
 
Mean, Huber estimates 
t-statistic 
p-value 
 
 
0.04 
(0.70) 
(0.70) 
0.23 
(3.30) 
(0.00) 
0.27 
(5.80) 
(0.00) 
0.17 
(2.80) 
(0.01) 
Mean, FGLS estimates 
z-statistic 
p-value 
 
0.043 
(0.80) 
(0.40) 
0.16 
(3.00) 
(0.00) 
0.29 
(5.10) 
(0.00) 
0.19 
(3.10) 
(0.00) 
Wilcoxon test 
Z-statistic 
p-value 
 
 
 
(0.18) 
(0.42) 
 
(2.58) 
(0.01) 
 
(2.85) 
(0.00) 
 
(2.04) 
(0.02) 
Number below median 
p-value 
6 
(0.73) 
2 
(0.03) 
1 
(0.01) 
3 
(0.11) 
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Table 4 
The ratio of foreign direct investment to private investment around countries’ first stock market liberalization 
 
The numbers in columns 3 through 6 are the ratio of foreign direct investment to private investment in the year of liberalization, the year after liberalization, the 
second year after liberalization, and the third year after liberalization, respectively.  Columns 7 through 11 give the sample mean, median, minimum, maximum, 
and standard deviation of the ratio of foreign direct investment to private investment, respectively.  Source:  The World Bank’s Stars database and the author’s 
calculations. 
 
 
Country 
 
Date of 
Liberalization  
 
 
T* 
 
 
T*+1 
 
 
T*+2 
 
 
T*+3 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
Median 
 
 
St Dev 
 
 
Min 
 
 
Max 
Years 
data are 
available 
            
Arg November 1989 0.088 0.148 
 
0.144 
 
0.136 0.087 0.080 0.057 -0.001 0.157 1984-93 
            
Braz March 1988 0.045 
 
0.013 
 
0.011 
 
0.013 0.029 0.028 0.017 0.008 0.056 1980-93 
            
Chil May 1987 0.082 
 
0.039 
 
0.242 
 
0.100 0.091 0.084 0.056 0.039 0.241 1982-93 
            
Col December 1991 0.117 
 
0.179 
 
0.143 
 
0.098 0.154 0.143 0.080 0.046 0.350 1984-94 
            
Ind June 1986 0.005 
 
0.007 
 
0.003 
 
0.007 0.004 0.004 0.003 -0.003 0.007 1976-92 
            
Kor June 1987 0.017 
 
0.019 
 
0.013 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.0003 0.019 1976-93 
            
Mal May 1987 0.097 
 
0.135 
 
0.238 
 
0.261 0.217 0.222 0.077 0.097 0.350 1976-93 
            
Mex May 1989 0.110 0.079 
 
0.111 
 
0.080 0.081 0.079 0.038 0.020 0.175 1979-94 
            
Phil May 1986 0.030 
 
0.068 
 
0.166 
 
0.077 0.043 0.030 0.043 -0.017 0.166 1976-94 
            
Thai January 1988 0.070 
 
0.083 
 
0.084 
 
0.059 0.045 0.043 0.022 0.011 0.084 1976-94 
            
Ven January 1990 0.189 
 
0.438 
 
0.107 
 
0.069 0.059 0.012 0.121 -0.131 0.438 1976-94 
Sample NA 0.077 0.110 0.116 0.083 0.069 0.061 0.029 0.034 0.129 NA 
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Table 5 
Private investment growth and stock returns 
 
The left-hand-side variable is the annual, continuously compounded growth rate of private investment in real local currency 
terms.  The variables tv , 1tv − , and 2tv −  denote the current, lagged, and two-year lagged real local currency return on the 
stock market respectively.  Lib , PostLib1 , PostLib2   are dummy variables that take on the value 1 in the year of 
stock market liberalization, the first year after stock market liberalization, and the second year after stock market 
liberalization, respectively.  tv Lib∗  denotes a variable which is equal to the product of tv  and Lib .  The other 
interactive terms are defined analogously.  A constant plus country-specific dummy variables and year dummies were also 
estimated but not reported.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Alternative regression specifications 
 
Right-hand-side variables 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
tv   0.05 (0.06) 
 
 
  0.04 
(0.06) 
    0.18** 
(0.07) 
1tv −    0.13*** (0.04) 
 
 
  0.13*** 
(0.04) 
      0.23*** 
(0.05) 
2tv −    -0.06 (0.06) 
 
 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
0.00 
(0.07) 
      
tv Lib∗      
       -0.38*** 
(0.14) 
 
      
1tv PostLib1− ∗      -0.00 (0.12) 
 
      
t-2v * PostLib2          0.24** (0.12) 
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Table 6 
Private investment, stock returns, and liquidity 
 
The left-hand-side variable is the annual, continuously compounded growth rate of  private investment in real local 
currency terms.  The right-hand-side variables are as follows.  tv , 1tv − , and 2tv −  denote the current, one-year lagged, 
and two-year-lagged real local currency return on the stock market, respectively.  Turnover is calculated as the value of 
total shares traded divided by market capitalization.  Value traded is calculated as the value of total shares divided by 
GDP.  The data on market capitalization and value of total shares traded are taken from the International Finance 
Corporation’s Emerging Markets Database.  The estimations are performed on data from the entire sample period for 
each of the 11 countries.  A constant plus country-specific dummy variables and year dummy variables were also 
estimated, but are not reported.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Alternative Regression Specifications 
 
Right-hand-side variables 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
tv  0.09 (0.09) 
 
  0.14 
(0.10) 
1tv −        0.19** (0.08) 
 
        0.22*** 
(0.08) 
2tv −    -0.11 (0.09) 
 
0.03 
(0.07) 
Change in 
turnover 
    -0.10** 
(0.05) 
 
  0.02 
(0.08) 
Change in turnover, one-
year lagged 
 0.01 
(0.08) 
 
 0.04 
(0.07) 
Change in turnover, two-
year lagged 
  0.22 
(0.10) 
 
     0.17** 
(0.08) 
Change in value  
traded 
-0.00 
(0.05) 
 
  -0.04 
 (0.06) 
Change in value traded, 
one-year lagged 
 0.03 
(0.05) 
 
 0.06 
(0.06) 
Change in value traded, 
two-year lagged 
  -0.18* 
(0.10) 
 -0.14* 
(0.08) 
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Table 7 
Economic reforms in the 11 sample countries 1985-1994 
 
S indicates that a macroeconomic stabilization program was implemented during the course of the year.  T indicates that 
a trade liberalization was implemented during the course of the year.  P indicates that a privatization program was 
implemented during the course of the year.  E indicates that exchange controls were eased during the course of the year.  
Source: Henry (1999). 
  
1985 
 
1986 
 
1987 
 
1988 
 
1989 
 
1990 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
Argentina S  ST TE SP P STE SP  TP 
           
Brazil  SE  ST T TPE P SP P  
           
Chile ST  P  S E TE E TP PE 
           
Colombia S T T  T T TPE TP TP T 
           
India    TE  T STP TPE E P 
           
Korea ST T T T E   P TP  
           
Malaysia   P T  P  T T E 
           
Mexico T T S SP  P P P  T 
           
Philippines  ST  P SP TPE STPE TPE P SP 
           
Thailand S T T   P TE P  T 
           
Venezuela P E   STE T TP P   
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Table 8 
The growth rate of private investment around countries’ first stock market liberalization revisited 
 
The left-hand-side variable is the annual, continuously compounded growth rate of private investment in real local currency 
terms. The estimation procedure is ordinary least squares.  A constant and 10 country-specific dummy variables were also 
estimated but not reported.  Lib  is a dummy variable which takes on the value 1 during the year of a country’s first stock 
market liberalization.  PostLib1  and PostLib2  take on the value 1 in each of the two subsequent years, respectively.  
The variables tv , 1tv − , and 2tv −  denote the current, lagged, and two-year lagged local currency logarithmic return on the 
stock market, respectively.  Stabilize, Trade, Privatize, and Exchange are dummy variables for the initiation of 
macroeconomic stabilization, trade opening, privatization, and exchange controls, respectively.  Stabilize1, Stabilize2, and 
Stabilize3 are dummy variables that take on the value 1 in the first, second, and third year after liberalization, respectively.  
The other reform variables are defined analogously.  Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.  *, **, *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Alternative regression specifications 
 
Right-hand-side variables 
 
Year Dummies 
 
T-bill and OECD Growth 
Year Dummies, T-bill, and 
OECD Growth 
Lib 0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
 (0.04) 
 
0.01 
(0.04) 
PostLib1 0.10 
(0.06) 
0.07 
 (0.05) 
 
  0.10* 
(0.06) 
PostLib2        0.33*** 
(0.06) 
       0.24*** 
(0.05) 
 
       0.31*** 
(0.05) 
PostLib3        0.20*** 
(0.05) 
    0.10** 
(0.05) 
 
       0.18*** 
(0.05) 
Stabilize 0.06 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
 
0.04 
(0.06) 
Stabilize1        0.22*** 
(0.04) 
       0.16*** 
(0.04) 
 
       0.22*** 
(0.04) 
Stabilize2 0.07 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
 
  0.07* 
(0.04) 
Stabilize3      0.17** 
(0.05) 
       0.15*** 
(0.04) 
 
       0.16*** 
(0.04) 
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Table 8, cont. 
Trade 0.01 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.00 
(0.05) 
 
Trade1 -0.04 
 (0.04) 
-0.04 
 (0.04) 
 
-0.04 
 (0.04) 
Trade2        0.09*** 
(0.04) 
     0.06** 
(0.03) 
     0.07** 
(0.03) 
 
Trade3 -0.05 
 (0.05) 
-0.05 
  (0.04) 
 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
Privatize -0.07 
 (0.04) 
-0.05 
  (0.04) 
-0.04 
 (0.04) 
 
Privatize1 0.05 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
 
Privatize2      0.09** 
(0.04) 
     0.09** 
(0.04) 
  0.08* 
(0.04) 
 
Privatize3 -0.09 
 (0.06) 
-0.03 
 (0.04) 
-0.06 
 (0.05) 
 
Exchange -0.09 
  (0.07) 
-0.12 
 (0.07) 
 
-0.08 
 (0.07) 
Exchange1 0.06 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
 
0.03 
(0.04) 
Exchange2       0.12** 
(0.05) 
  0.08* 
(0.05) 
 
     0.11** 
(0.05) 
Exchange3 -0.00 
 (0.07) 
-0.08 
 (0.06) 
-0.08 
 (0.06) 
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Fig. 1.  The response of private investment to stock market liberalization.  This figure plots the average growth rate of private investment in real local currency terms 
across all 11 countries in stock market liberalization time.  For example, the value on the y-axis corresponding to the x-axis value of T* is the average growth rate of 
private investment across all 11 countries in the year the stock market was liberalized.  
                      Private Investment Growth 
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Fig. 2.  Real stock returns and the growth rate of real private investment.  The solid line is the average return on the stock market in real local currency terms across all 
11 countries.  The dashed line is the average growth rate of private investment in real local currency terms across all 11 countries. 
